Advantageous Ethics: Contra Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Advantageous Ethics: Contra Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
The relation between the content of morality and our ability to grasp it–supposing our moral beliefs were determined by evolution.
This paper–now with alterations thanks to the generous feedback of my teacher–was originally submitted for my philosophy class.
1. Abstract
In moral philosophy it is often thought that if morality were objective, that an evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs would leave us without any moral knowledge.1 Essentially, it’s thought that evolutionary forces are irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs if we’re moral objectivists. I will argue that we can circumvent this problem if morality has advantageous content–moral facts that, if grasped, would provide an evolutionary advantage. I will then respond to two objections. The first being that accurate moral beliefs wouldn’t be selected for since there would be no evolutionary disadvantage in lacking true moral beliefs. The second being that it would be a miracle if our moral beliefs were on track, even if morality had advantageous moral content. I conclude by arguing that we have reason to believe that morality has advantageous content if we have moral knowledge–something which is supposed by certain proponents of “evolutionary debunking” arguments.
In this essay, I’ll be referring to morality in an objectivist sense unless specified.
2. The Issue
The concern that evolutionary forces are irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs begins with the twin assumptions that, (1) we hold the moral beliefs we do because of evolutionary forces, and (2) that morality is objective.2 Moral objectivism refers to a family of metaethical views that assert that morality isn’t relative to, or dependent upon anyone. If morality is objective, then the facts of morality–much like facts about the shape and age of the earth–exist independently of us and our opinions.3 But, as evolution only selects for what is advantageous, it’s not clear how the ability to grasp objective moral facts would be selected for.4 It’s especially unclear why evolution would select for this ability when certain unjustified ‘moral’ beliefs would be selected for regardless of whether they were representative of moral reality.5 For example, evolution would select for the ‘moral’ belief that protecting one’s children is ‘morally’ required, even if morality forbade such protective actions. As a result, it seems that if morality is objective, and if we accept an evolutionary explanation for our moral beliefs, then we’re left without any moral knowledge at all, since we’d have no grounds to believe our moral beliefs were justified.6
This “evolutionary debunking” argument is of a genealogical nature. Essentially, a belief is undermined by showing that the cause of this belief had nothing to do with the truth of that belief. For example, suppose you learnt that all the beliefs you held about the Inca were derived from a book written by a randomised word generator. This discovery would surely undermine these beliefs–unless we had additional reason to think our beliefs were “on track” with the truth.
3. Two Proposed Solutions
I will now outline two responses to this problem and argue that we should favour the latter. The first response, offered by the philosopher Sharon Street, is to treat this undermining result as an argument against moral objectivism.7 Essentially, this response treats the fact that we have moral knowledge (that global evaluative skepticism is false) as a fixed point–something to be assumed at the outset as true. Since it seems that moral objectivism cannot accommodate this fixed point, we should adopt a non-objectivist metaethical view of morality.8 For example, that morality is in some sense constructed by us and dependent on things about us.
In opposition however, my response denies that the twin assumptions–that we hold the moral beliefs we do due to evolution, and morality is objective–entail an undermining of moral knowledge. While it is true that evolution only selects for what is advantageous, and not necessarily what is true; if the two were to converge, then there would be a plausible explanation as to why having a disposition to form true moral beliefs would be selected for. Thus, if accurate beliefs about morality would be advantageous to possess, then moral objectivists would have good reason to think their moral beliefs were tracking objective moral facts. I favour this response because it not only shows that moral objectivists have an adequate reply to evolutionary debunking arguments, but that the same commitment to moral knowledge in the first response can be used in favour of my response.
4. Response Part One: Irrelevant Influences
The argument in favour of my response will have two stages, first I will argue that morality having advantageous content solves the problem created by evolutionary debunking arguments. Afterward I will argue that morality has advantageous content if we have moral knowledge–utilising Street’s own fixed point that we have moral knowledge. Here is my first argument:
The Argument from Advantageous Content:
If morality has advantageous content, then evolution would select for the capacity to grasp moral truths.
If evolution would select for the capacity to grasp moral truths, then evolutionary forces needn’t be irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs.
C. So, if morality has advantageous content, then evolutionary forces needn’t be irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs.
This argument is valid, meaning the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. It also demonstrates how morality having advantageous content is supposed to solve the problem posed by evolutionary debunking arguments–it shows that evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs aren’t sufficient in undermining them. I will now argue why we should accept the two premises of this argument.
Regarding the first premise: advantageous moral content simply refers to objective moral facts, that, if grasped by us, would be evolutionarily advantageous. For example, if it was a moral fact that we ought to protect our children from harm, then it would be evolutionarily advantageous to grasp such a fact as it would provide the means of acquiring a moral belief that encourages/ vindicates advantageous behaviour (that of protecting one’s children). Advantageous moral content is definitionally evolutionarily advantageous to grasp. Combined with the fact that evolution selects for capacities and characteristics that are evolutionarily advantageous, we can appreciate how the first premise is accurate. The key idea is that evolution “cares” about selecting for the capacity to grasp true beliefs about some domain if it would be evolutionarily advantageous to grasp such truths.
4.1 The Disadvantage Objection
One might object to the first premise (as Street would9) on the grounds that not selecting for true moral beliefs wouldn’t incur any evolutionary disadvantage, since certain beliefs would be selected for regardless (justified or not).10 For example, an unjustified ‘moral’ belief about protecting one’s children being obligatory would be selected for by evolution, even if someone were to fail to grasp the true moral fact that protecting one’s children is obligatory.11 But compare this to the ability to spot predators–presumably those without this capacity would have died out.12 However, this position overly constricts what it means for something to be selected for by evolution. To illustrate this point, consider the following thought experiment:
Suppose there is a population of moths that have a predation problem. Getting faster or developing better camouflage would be evolutionarily advantageous for these moths (it would help them avoid predation). But suppose that once one of these characteristics was developed, there would be no disadvantage in not developing the other.
Prior to the moth developing one of the characteristics, we can appreciate that evolution would dually select for the moths to get faster or to develop better camouflage, even if these characteristics were just as advantageous as the other to develop. The issue then with the objection against the first premise is that it amounts to the following argument. Suppose someone was to argue that the ability to get faster wouldn’t have been selected for by evolution since there would be no evolutionary disadvantage in failing to develop it. But only because some other trait (better camouflage) would have been selected for (and presumably developed) in the absence of the ability to get faster. But this argument is clearly mistaken. Just because some other trait B would have been developed in the absence of another trait A (thus there would be no disadvantage in failing to develop trait A), doesn’t entail that evolution wouldn’t have selected for trait A. Thus, this objection to the first premise is mistaken.
Hence, evolution would still select for the capacity to grasp advantageous moral truths, even if there was no disadvantage in failing to develop it. This concludes my support and defence of the first premise. I will now move on to the second premise.
Premise two says:
If evolution would select for the capacity to grasp moral truths, then evolutionary forces needn’t be irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs.
Essentially, if evolution would “care” about selecting for having accurate moral faculties, then the fact that our moral beliefs are a result of evolutionary forces is not sufficient to undermine them. I think we should believe this premise is right, so long as a further worry can be adequately handled.
4.2 The Miracle Objection
The main worry that I take there to be with the second premise is that there is still a real chance that evolutionary forces can still be irrelevant influences, even if it turns out that they’re not. Presuming that our beliefs are undermined if they can be easily mistaken, this would mean that evolutionary forces can still be irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs, even if evolution selects for the capacity to grasp moral truths.
Consider another case in which we come to have beliefs about the Inca based on a book. Suppose there was a mix-up at the publishers and we didn’t know if the book was authored by a historian with a deep knowledge about the Inca, or a deceptive AI that didn’t have any information about the Inca in its database. There is a very real chance in which the AI has influenced our beliefs, and since such an influence would be completely irrelevant to the truth, there is a very real chance our beliefs are mistaken. It would be a sort of miracle if our current beliefs turned out to be right.
Likewise for moral objectivists, there is a chance that evolutionary forces are irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs provided that evolution needn’t have selected for the capacity to grasp moral facts to garner similar (or the same) advantageous beliefs. Like the case with the history book publishers, there is a very real chance that our moral beliefs aren’t representative of any moral facts at all, but are merely adaptive beliefs that don’t track with morality. It would be a sort of miracle if our beliefs were tracking an objective moral realm–it would be based on an evolutionary coin flip, even if morality had advantageous content.
At the heart of this concern is the presumption that if there is a real chance that our beliefs could be mistaken, then our current beliefs are unjustified unless we cannot provide legitimate evidence as to why our beliefs are correct. For instance, in the case of the book publishers, presumably we could go out and check with the historian who’s work was supposed to be published. The challenge then posited to moral objectivists is to identify some relevantly analogous way of vindicating our moral beliefs.
There are at least two ways to push back against this line of argument. First, we could reject the presumption leading to the challenge. Second, we could provide some way to vindicate our beliefs. I’m inclined to provide a response that utilises elements of both of these strategies. My response will centre around arguing that certain capacities we take ourselves to have can be utilised to vindicate those same capacities / relevantly connected capacities–else risk a collapse into wholesale skepticism.
Here is my response: by utilising the experience of grasping morality, I think we can vindicate–at least some of–our moral beliefs. This move might look incredibly suspect to a skeptic, as it seems I’m basically utilising one capacity to vindicate another that is arguably identical, or at least, suspiciously similar. However, I maintain that this a decent and legitimate response that moral objectivists can make use of. I think it provides legitimate evidence to believe that evolution gave us the ability to grasp morality.
I don’t think a skeptic should discount this approach since this seems to be a perfectly adequate response in a variety of other cases. Consider a continued version of the book publisher thought experiment. Suppose that whilst on your way to check your beliefs with the author, you find yourself on a train sitting next to a skeptic. You tell them about your plight and your plan. The skeptic replies that it won’t do any good since you’re just supposing that your perceptions are accurately reporting what’s actually in the external world. Any belief you have about the external world is suspect provided that there are a great many cases in which they’re not reliable. For instance, evolution could have selected for something else other than accurate perceptions13, you may be a brain in a vat or under the deception of Descartes’ evil demon. But presumably these possibilities–though real–don’t undermine our beliefs about the external world.
Presumably those looking to utilise evolutionary debunking arguments are looking to charge moral objectivist positions with a special problem that doesn’t apply to all sorts of other beliefs like those concerned with the reliability of our perceptions. With this in mind, it’s clear that this is not a special objection to moral objectivism.
That being said, there seems to be something permissible with utilising one sense to vindicate another, but when there are no additional senses to rely upon, it seems we can’t do anything but rely on them (and this is seen as problematic). I think this is why it seems perfectly fine to vindicate one’s belief about the Inca by speaking to the historian, in comparison to using your experience of grasping morality to vindicate that you can actually grasp morality, or using sight to vindicate whether your sight is working. That being said, there are times in which such a thing does seem legitimate. Sometimes we take our selves to see one thing, but upon looking again we realise we had been deceived, e.g. by a trick of the light.
Overall, I don’t think it’s an illegitimate move to utilise the experience of grasping morality to provide some evidence as to which pathway evolution took us. Sure, we might not be able to exactly tell the difference between the real ability and the fake ability to grasp morality, but ditto for (almost?) everything else.
This concludes my support of the second premise. Thus, with the argument from advantageous content vindicated, we should accept that morality having advantageous content is sufficient to show that evolutionary forces needn’t be irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs.
5. Response Part Two: Content & Moral Knowledge
The next (and final) stage of the argument in favour of my response, is to utilise the premise that we have moral knowledge (the same fixed point in Street’s response14) to vindicate the position that morality actually has advantageous content.15 Here is the argument:
The Argument from Moral Knowledge:
We have moral knowledge–global evaluative skepticism is false.
If we have moral knowledge, then our moral beliefs are not completely mistaken or unjustified.
If our moral beliefs are not completely mistaken or unjustified, then morality has advantageous content.
C. So, morality has advantageous content.
I think this argument is valid. The first premise is simply the fixed point assumed by Street in her response to the evolutionary debunking argument–we have moral knowledge. The second premise is extremely plausible, simply asserting that if we have moral knowledge, then some of our moral beliefs must be right and justified. The third premise, however, is more controversial–but that should not be a problem here. It amounts to the conditional that if morality has no advantageous content, then we’re completely mistaken or unjustified in our moral beliefs. Specifically, it claims that all of our moral beliefs are either adaptive, or are derived from more fundamental moral beliefs that are adaptive. In essence then, rejecting this premise would imply that some of our moral beliefs have origins outside of problematically pure evolutionary forces. But this would give up the debunking game.16 So, if we suppose that our moral beliefs are purely a result of evolutionary forces (direct or indirect)–as I am in this essay–we should conditionally accept this third premise. With each premise vindicated then, we should (conditionally, on pain of rejecting premise three) accept the conclusion that morality has advantageous content.
Overall, I think we should not only favour my response over Street’s17, but that we should accept that morality having advantageous content is a plausible response for moral objectivists to make in response to evolutionary debunking arguments–supposing our moral beliefs are a result of evolutionary forces.
6. Conclusion
In this essay I’ve argued that if morality has advantageous content, then evolutionary forces needn’t be irrelevant influences on our moral beliefs. I then defended this argument from the objection that evolution wouldn’t select for accurate moral beliefs as there would be nothing evolutionarily disadvantageous in failing to grasp moral truths. I argued that this was too narrow a conception of what it means for evolution to select for something. I also defended this argument from the notion that we should believe our moral beliefs are unjustified since evolution could have easily gone down a different path. I argued that we can rely on our experience of grasping morality as evidence of which pathway evolution took–else this objection seems to land us in (almost?) wholesale skepticism. I then concluded by arguing that we have reason to believe morality has advantageous content utilising Street’s own fixed point that we have moral knowledge.
Reference List:
Shafer-Landau, R. (2012). ‘Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge’. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy. 7(1), pp. 1-38.
Street, S. (2018). ‘Does Anything Really Matter or Did We Just Evolve to Think So?’. In: The Norton introduction to philosophy. 2nd ed. Byrne, A. Cohen, J. Rosen, G.A. Harman, E. & Shiffrin, S.V. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, pp. 904-912
Street (2018).
Street (2018).
This is true for at least the fundamental moral facts/principles as opposed to moral facts concerning particulars, e.g. it’s a moral fact that it was wrong for Sam to steal from Jane, in comparison to, it’s a moral fact that theft is wrong.
Street (2018).
Street (2018).
Street (2018).
Street (2018).
Street (2018).
Street (2018) 910.
Street (2018) 910.
Street (2018) 910.
Street (2018) 910.
Essentially, to claim that having accurate perceptions is adaptive, one must first rely on their perceptions:
“We can know that adaptive perceptual practices are also reliable ones only if we already have a sense of which perceptual judgments are true and which are false. We can tell that dispositions to hold false perceptual beliefs are likely to be maladaptive only if we can identify some false perceptual beliefs, show that they tend to undermine fitness and make inferences from those cases. If we were in no position to know which perceptual beliefs are false, then we could not know that false perceptual beliefs tend to be maladaptive.”
Shafer-Landau (2012) 23.
Street (2018).
Another approach that I don’t explore here is to appeal to the existence of moral fixed points. Essentially, there are necessary moral truths of the sort like: it’s wrong to wantonly slaughter innocent people. If there are such fixed points, then there is a solid basis to claim that morality has advantageous moral content (at least for creatures like us in a world like ours).
Shafer-Landau (2012) 7.
This is because Street is motivated to reject objectivism because it presumably cannot account for moral knowledge–when we surely have such knowledge. But, if my essay is right, objectivism can hold onto moral knowledge, and thus Street’s move becomes unwarranted. She may have other reasons for favouring non-objectivist views, but that’s by the by. Of course, objectivists are happy to return the favour, e.g. by arguing that her account of morality cannot explain how anyone is blameworthy provided that it denies the existence of categorical moral reasons.