"Moral Error Theory is Mistaken Because Genocide is Wrong"

Can we argue that some metaethical view is mistaken because it has unacceptable entailments?

Circular ripples in philosophical reflection. Image created by Midjourney.

To begin

It’s often argued by moral objectivists that non-objectivist views entail absurd and unacceptable results. For example, moral error theory posits that nothing is morally wrong (or right) with genocide (since nothing is wrong or right), and moral subjectivism cannot provide the grounds to legitimately criticise those with coherent sets of preferences (no matter how vulgar) provided know what they truly stand for. Though it’s important to stress that it being impossible for subjectivists to legitimately criticise such an individual doesn’t mean they must be okay with their behaviour–just that they can’t point to some moral requirement that they’re flouting in acting as they do.

Moral error theory is (roughly) the metaethical view that morality doesn’t exist, and we’re all in error when making moral claims.
Moral subjectivism is (roughly) the metaethical view that morality is determined by the individual’s preferences–essentially, what someone cares about.

These absurd and unacceptable results are then utilised as considerations (evidence) against such views, and in favour of moral objectivism–which doesn’t face such entailments (see Appendix 1 for pushback against this). Though, it’s important to note that since these arguments are indirect arguments in favour of moral objectivism, that they can also be utilised by other metaethical views (provided they don’t face the same entailments).

One concern that is often voiced by detractors in response to such arguments is that they merely beg the question. To beg the question is simply to presuppose what you’re supposed to be arguing for. Consider the following argument against subjectivism:

P1. Subjectivism is mistaken.
C. Therefore, subjectivism is mistaken.

The first (and only) premise in this argument simply presupposes what was supposed to be argued for (that subjectivism is mistaken). This is clearly a bad argument–nobody should be impressed by it.

The detractor’s claim is then: in arguing that error theory is mistaken because it entails that there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide, we’re just presupposing exactly what we’re supposed to be arguing for. Nobody should be impressed with your argument Mr Objectivist!

Is it Actually Question Begging?

It’s not clear that it is question begging to make such an argument however. Or, at the very least, it’s not clear how it would be a case of problematic question begging. The argument on the table is the following:

The Genocide Argument Against Error Theory

P1. If moral error theory is true, then there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide.
→ This does not imply that error theorists don’t care about genocide or wouldn’t try to prevent it–just that it’s neither morally wrong nor morally right, since nothing is morally wrong or right under error theory.

P2. But, there is something wrong with genocide.

C. So, moral error theory is false.

Other arguments can be constructed for other non-objectivist metaethical views too.

The Rescue Argument Against Subjectivism¹

1. If moral subjectivism is true, then someone doesn’t have to rescue a drowning child if they don’t care to.
   → This does not imply that subjectivists are perfectly fine with this behaviour–nor that they should tolerate it. Subjectivists can consistently be outraged at such a moral monster.

2. But, such an individual would be required to save the child (all else being equal).

3. So, moral subjectivism is false.

So on and so forth.

Now, are such arguments problematically question begging? I don’t believe so. Whilst arguments that blatantly beg the question simply state the truth of the conclusion, these other arguments point out reasons to believe that the view in question is mistaken. Sure, a committed subjectivist or error theorist would simply reject premise 2, but that doesn’t show these arguments to be question begging–merely that they’re antecedently committed for some reason or another.

Maybe you’re not convinced. I get it. Let me offer some examples of arguments that you might have already come across and found convincing, yet follow the same trend.

The Golden Rule… is Mistaken!

Consider the following argument:

1. If the golden rule is true, then masochists can permissibly go around harming others.

2. Masochists cannot permissibly go around harming others.

3. Therefore, the golden rule is false.

Another argument can be made like this:

1. If the golden rule is true, then I cannot permissibly treat someone in some way provided I wouldn’t want to be treated that way.

2. But, I can permissibly treat someone in such a way. (e.g. I may prefer not to be made to go to the dentist, but this doesn’t prohibit me from taking my children there).

3. Therefore, the golden rule is false.

The important thing to notice in these arguments is that premise two, in some sense, begs the question against the golden rule. After all, the argument relies on highlighting an entailment of the golden rule and supposes that it’s mistaken. Yet, these arguments are still compelling–they should be compelling. I think they’re good arguments, even though someone antecedently committed to the golden rule would always reject premise 2.

Something important to notice however, is that if we are to criticise these arguments, we shouldn’t rely on the idea that they’re supposedly “question begging”. We criticise them like we would any other valid argument–by rejecting and arguing against its premises. So even if the arguments I’ve provided are mistaken, they’re not mistaken because they “beg the question”.

Absolutist Deontology… is Mistaken!

One more example. One argument that might be more familiar is the criticism of the axe murderer at the door sent the way of absolutist deontology. The criticism of the axe murderer is a thought experiment meant to show how absolutist deontology entails absurd results.

The thought experiment is as follows: A man hears a knock on the front door and opens up to a murderer with an axe. They tell him that they’re looking for his friend–the friend who, last time the man checked, was in his living room. The man can either lie, say nothing, or tell the truth. But, according to absolutist deontology, it is NEVER permissible to lie. Thus, if we restrict our choices to either being able to lie or tell the truth (we can’t say nothing) then we must tell the truth.

Argument 1:

1. If absolutist deontology is right, then we cannot permissibly lie to the axe murderer.

2. But, we can permissibly lie to the axe murderer.

3. So, absolutist deontology is wrong.

Like before, we can see how this argument might be thought as being question begging–the 2nd premise supposes absolutist deontology is mistaken. But the important difference between this argument and others that are viciously question begging, like this…

Argument 2:

1. Absolutist deontology is wrong.

2. So, absolutist deontology is wrong.

… is the following. The 2nd premise of Argument 1 focuses on supposing that an entailment of the view is mistaken. However, Argument 2 supposes this without drawing on any reasons why.

Objection:

But these arguments concern normative and practical ethics, not metaethics. We can’t rely on practical/normative ethic positions to argue for and against metaethical views.

I’m inclined to ask why that should matter, especially for our purposes here. This quite substantially changes the subject. However, even this new objection is mistaken, since it misses the importance of being able to explain important pieces of morality. E.g. some things really are right and wrong, not caring about rescuing someone doesn’t get you off the hook of a requirement to save them, and so forth.

Fair Game, But Not Always Convincing

Whilst these arguments are decent, we can agree that it would be useless to present them to someone who is already committed to absolutist deontology and the golden rule. After all, they’d just accept the implications! One person’s modus ponens, is another’s modus tollens, as they say.

However, this does speak to a practical note. Clearly these arguments wouldn’t be a good fit for those such committed. However, when talking with others, we don’t yet know how they will respond to such arguments. It’s in offering these arguments that we can discover where someone stands after all.

One important thing to consider, is that someone might be antecedently committed to some view, but only because they’re mistaken about some entailment of rejecting it. For instance, suppose someone thinks that by rejecting metaethical subjectivism that they’d be forced to conclude that there are some true contradictions. However, in clearing this assumption away, our interlocutors may be more likely to be persuaded by our arguments. So, if we cannot initially convince someone of an argument, we should check to see if they have such assumptions.

---

Appendix 1: Anti-Realist Pushback

There is an argument of sorts I’ve encountered a number of times online that claims realism faces the same absurd entailments as views like non-objectivism. For example, it could be the case that objective morality demands us to torture people for fun. Thus, even if this entailment counts as evidence against non-objectivists, then it also counts as evidence against objectivism.

Firstly, this needn’t apply to arguments that don’t rely on mere possibility. For instance, some people really don’t care about rescuing children. An objectivist on the other hand could take refuge in the fact that, if it were the case that torturing others for fun was demanded if moral objectivism were right, then that would count against the view. However, is it really the case that torturing others for fun is demanded by an objective morality? This admission only works as evidence against moral objectivism once it’s demonstrated that such a thing is true. For example, if you discovered that your head didn’t contain a brain (anti-realist moment 😉), that would count against the view that having a brain is necessary for being conscious. But, this would only count as such evidence against your previous view if this state of affairs actually came about.

Secondly, these criticisms don’t apply to moral objectivist views that accept so called moral fixed points. In an effort to account for an important piece of morality, the philosophers John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, and Russ Shafer-Landau in their book The Moral Universe (2024), introduce the moral fixed points.

Essentially, it seems that morality, if it exists, is not arbitrary–not just anything goes. For instance, all else being equal, it would be absurd to suggest that the appropriate response to one’s making a promise to make a meal to a family in need could be to hop on one leg and perform a lopsided Macarena.² Rather, what would be fitting (and necessarily so) would be the action of providing–and the actions taken to provide–such a meal, all else being equal.

With this response in mind, we can then appreciate how it simply couldn’t be the case that objective morality could demand such things of us as wanton torture, senseless killing, and cruel behaviour–at least in a universe like ours with creatures like us.³ Thus, moral realism (at least of the sort that accepts the moral fixed points, or something relevantly like it) stays on top of this anti-realist deflected argument.

I discuss both of these responses in some more detail here.

---

References:

1. Bengson, J. Cuneo, T. & Shafer-Landau. (2024). ‘Moral Realism and Its Burdens’. In: The Moral Universe. Oxford University Press, pp. 38-64

2. Bengson, J. Cuneo, T. & Shafer-Landau. (2024). ‘Methodology in Metaethics’. In: The Moral Universe. Oxford University Press, pp. 13-37

1. Weaker arguments can be made that follow a similar pattern, e.g.

1. Metaethical views that posit that morality is entirely dependent on what one cares about entail unacceptable results (e.g. if someone doesn’t care to rescue a drowning child, then they don’t have to).

2. If some metaethical view entails unacceptable results, then that counts as evidence against those views.

3. Subjectivism posits that morality is entirely dependent on what one cares about.

4. Therefore, this counts as evidence against subjectivism.

2. Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau offer a similar example in their book The Moral Universe (2024) 23.

3. Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau add this clarification to push back against extravagant thought experiments that attempted to undermine such fixed points in The Moral Universe (2024).