Your distnction between normative and metaphysical restriction really clarifies why Yaffe's view works better. The prisoner with the ability to escape but chooses to stay is still being punished because the permissibility of leaving has been removed. I wonder though if the Austin case reveals something diferent than just forgiveness being powerful. Could the prerogative to pardon actually be more about protecting victims from having their agency overidenby institutional responses?
In the Austin case, I was wondering if your view shows more than just that forgiveness is powerful, i.e. once Austin freely pardons their partner, it seems like the state’s standing to punish for that same wrong is normatively constrained. Is part of your view that the victim’s authority to pardon can limit what institutions may permissibly do in treating the perpetrator as still punish-worthy?
For sure, namely because they can't treat them as punish-worthy anymore, since they lack such a status given the fact that they've been pardoned. So for instance, without adequate justification, they couldn't continue punishing them. They could stop punishing and instead do something like keep them from seeing Austin by keeping them locked away (like in cases of quarantine), but such a thing couldn't be a punishment, and it would similarly have to be justified–which it seems to be given the situation.
I also enjoyed your article questioning animals and murder.
I've held a somewhat strange view (that I haven't heard anyone even bring up) that it is actually a moral good to just get rid of nature in the first place, as on balance, you would be greatly reducing overall suffering if nature did not exist. For instance, I'm pretty sure the average sentient animal's life in nature is absolute misery.
Of course not advocating going out destroying nature, but just my view that if nature did not exist, it would reduce overall suffering.
Your distnction between normative and metaphysical restriction really clarifies why Yaffe's view works better. The prisoner with the ability to escape but chooses to stay is still being punished because the permissibility of leaving has been removed. I wonder though if the Austin case reveals something diferent than just forgiveness being powerful. Could the prerogative to pardon actually be more about protecting victims from having their agency overidenby institutional responses?
Thanks for the comment. I’m not entirely sure I understand what you take the Austin case to show. Perhaps you could reword it?
Thanks for the reply! Sorry if I wasn't clear,
In the Austin case, I was wondering if your view shows more than just that forgiveness is powerful, i.e. once Austin freely pardons their partner, it seems like the state’s standing to punish for that same wrong is normatively constrained. Is part of your view that the victim’s authority to pardon can limit what institutions may permissibly do in treating the perpetrator as still punish-worthy?
For sure, namely because they can't treat them as punish-worthy anymore, since they lack such a status given the fact that they've been pardoned. So for instance, without adequate justification, they couldn't continue punishing them. They could stop punishing and instead do something like keep them from seeing Austin by keeping them locked away (like in cases of quarantine), but such a thing couldn't be a punishment, and it would similarly have to be justified–which it seems to be given the situation.
I hope that answers your question.
Yep, amazing read, subscribed!
Thanks so much!
I also enjoyed your article questioning animals and murder.
I've held a somewhat strange view (that I haven't heard anyone even bring up) that it is actually a moral good to just get rid of nature in the first place, as on balance, you would be greatly reducing overall suffering if nature did not exist. For instance, I'm pretty sure the average sentient animal's life in nature is absolute misery.
Of course not advocating going out destroying nature, but just my view that if nature did not exist, it would reduce overall suffering.