Things, Ends, and Animals
Why we should think animals matter, and what it might entail.
Introduction
There are two main sections in this article. In PART ONE, I argue for the position that animals are (what I call) ‘ends per se’.1 That is, they matter per se. They are someones, not somethings. The three main considerations I put forward in favour of this position are:
We can wrong animals.
Views that deny animals matter per se affirm that we only have indirect obligations to animals, but these views fail to adequately explain wrongdoing involving animals.
Treating animals in various ways for their own sake is not overblown or ridiculous.
Following this I provide a short overview of these considerations in argument form as well as some cases for further reflection.
Then in PART TWO, I discuss how we might be obligated to treat animals given that they matter per se, and I offer answers to certain questions on how we are to show them the respect they deserve. In particular, I outline a fundamental negative right revolving around the wrongness of treating animals as mere means (using animals in an immoral way). I expand on how this fundamental right provides the grounds for the position that all* animal usage is wrong (no matter how painless), and thus industries like animal agriculture, animal sports, etc. fail to treat animals with the respect they deserve. If this is correct; then this counts as a decisive blow against the existence of such industries since they would be inherently unjust.
Contents
PART ONE
Things & Ends Per Se
Do Animals Matter Per Se?
Overview
Cases for Further Reflection
PART TWO
Treating Animals as Ends Per Se
References
PART ONE
Things & Ends Per Se
Ethically speaking, there are two kinds of moral status one could possess–that of a mere thing or an end per se. If something is a thing, then what happens to it doesn’t matter (at least not for its own sake). In addition, and most crucially, the value of a thing is derived from its usability. Consider an ordinary desk. We could use it to hold up our appliances and to provide a surface to read on. If it were to break and/or fail to be useful to us, there would be nothing morally amiss, at least in itself, with throwing it away. Its value is merely contingent on its usefulness. This is because, like all things, its value is merely instrumental.
Contrast that with an end per se. If someone is an end per se, then, unlike things, what happens to them matters per se–it matters for their own sake. Thus, the value of an end per se is not contingent on its usability–they are not merely instrumentally valuable. They aren’t mere things! Consider an artist who abducts innocent persons and kills them by turning them into twisted art sculptures. Such a person would be treating these people as if they were mere things and not ends per se. Such treatment has greatly wronged these individuals, if it has, because they are not merely instrumentally valuable. Rather, they are intrinsically valuable. They are not mere things to be used for whatever purpose someone may happen to have in mind for them.
A DICHOTOMY OF VALUE & OBLIGATIONS
Given the sorts of value presented, it’s clear to see a dichotomy between them. You either matter for your own sake, or you don’t.2 If you’re an end per se, you matter directly. But if you’re a thing, you matter only indirectly, for some other sake than yourself (if at all). This is why things cannot be owed direct moral obligations, and thus cannot be wronged. There is no right way to treat things for their own sake. Consider someone taking a sledgehammer to a piece of expensive medical equipment that a person needs to live. Treating the equipment in this way is wrong, not for the sake of the equipment, but for the sake of the patient. In this sense, the assailant had an indirect obligation to the medical equipment which was grounded by a direct obligation to the patient using it. The act did not wrong the equipment, it wronged the patient. Something important to take note of is that if we have direct duties to someone–if we can feasibly wrong them in some way–they must be an end per se. Individuals who are ends per se are individuals with dignity. They are owed respect by all moral agents.
The idea that we should treat others with respect can be rather vague, so let me offer a plausible example. How we ought to treat others with respect is evident in Immanuel Kant’s Principle of Humanity. It denotes a categorical imperative3 to always treat others, who are ends per se, always as ends and never merely as means. Roughly speaking, don’t treat those who are intrinsically valuable as mere instruments. Don’t treat ends per se as things; doing so violates their dignity.
IN SUMMARY
If one is a thing, then one only matters instrumentally. Things are thus owed nothing directly and cannot be wronged. How they are to be treated is solely contingent on considerations other than them in the form of indirect obligations, i.e. treating property with care for the sake of the owner.
If one is an end per se, then one matters intrinsically. Ends per se are thus owed direct moral obligations and are wronged if they are not treated with adequate respect, i.e. by being treated as if they were mere things.
For those who are still unsure about the concepts of indirect and direct obligations, I will quickly define them.
Direct Obligation:
An obligation owed directly to someone. Some treatment we owe others for their own sake.i.e. I owe it directly to strangers not to abduct them and turn them into art sculptures.
Indirect Obligation:
An obligation owed regarding something. Some treatment we owe something for some other sake than itself.i.e. I have an indirect obligation to treat some medical equipment with care if someone is using it to live, but only because I have direct obligations to the patient. I owe it to the patient not to destroy the live preserving equipment they’re relying on.
Do Animals Matter Per Se?
Now that we have different senses of how one matters on the table; we’re in a position to appreciate the significance of questions like:
Do animals matter directly (per se) or only indirectly?
Can we feasibly wrong animals in our treatment of them?
Do we owe any sort of treatment directly to animals?
The answers to these questions will determine whether animals are mere things or ends per se–whether they are mere commodities or individuals with moral rights. Whether they matter per se. Those more skeptical of choosing the latter side of the divide (those who deny animals4 matter intrinsically) will deny that we have any direct obligations to them. But presented with indirect obligation views such as these, an important question becomes apparent:
Can indirect obligation views towards animals sufficiently explain cases of immoral behavior involving animals?
Suppose that in
Installation; A man travels around the city in a large van capturing abandoned animals. Once he’s accumulated 100 he takes them back to his studio where he melts, stitches, staples and glues them all together into a giant writhing mass of living flesh. Pleased with his work, he moves the artwork to it’s designated display in the centre of the city where hundreds of thousands of people can see it. He unveils it with resounding success. Given the specific cultural beliefs of this society, they are unphased by animals suffering and find animal sculptures (especially amalgamations) rather intriguing and creative.
Over the next few weeks the animals that make up the sculpture slowly succumb to their injuries.
What has occurred in Installation is very wrong, and for those who think we can wrong animals, it’s clear to see why. The artist has treated these animals as mere materials to be used in an artwork–he has treated them as mere things. In contrast, folks who endorse indirect obligation views will either attempt to explain the wrongness via other considerations than the animals themselves or simply reject the idea that wrongdoing has taken place.5 I won’t address the latter view here. But those who endorse such a view would certainly show us where they stand.6
ALREADY NOT ENOUGH
Those who deny that we can wrong animals, but hold that Installation contains wrongdoing will need to rely on other considerations than the animals themselves. By my lights, this already fails as a sufficient account of the wrongdoing present, since it denies a crucial consideration against making an art installation out of animals–namely that such an act wrongs those animals. We can especially appreciate this if we were to swap out the animals in Installation with inanimate objects like desks. After all, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong, in and of itself, with reforming abandoned desks into an art sculpture. But when considering Installation we can appreciate the wrongdoing as soon as we realise that the animals are being treated as mere things who don’t matter. We could think of additional considerations that explain the wrongdoing, however, it would seem far-fetched to think these explanations could explain all the wrongness since they attempt to explain it all away without mention of the animal and how we should be treating them for their own sake. The very fact that indirect obligations deny that we can wrong animals is, by itself, a consideration against such views. Skeptics (of course) won’t find this particularly convincing, so let us explore whether indirect obligation views can muster the explanations needed to make sense of the wrongdoing in Installation.
CONSEQUENCES & DEVELOPING BAD MORAL CHARACTER
Philosophers like Immanuel Kant deny that we owe anything to animals themselves, but that we should still treat them with compassion and kindness. But not for the animal’s sake, but instead for humanity.7 Kant worries that if we treat animals harshly, we will go on to treat rational beings harshly in tandem– “he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men”. Whilst there is at least some truth to this,8 it still fails to seriously condemn making artworks out of living animals. People who treat animals as mere materials needn’t be driven to treat rational beings in the same way. We can imagine an individual who recognises the intrinsic value of rational beings and understands that treating them as mere things is a moral outrage. We can emphasise this point in Installation and clarify that the artist and his audience won’t be driven to callousness9–yet it seems, the wrongness persists! This explanation of wrongdoing is also quite lackluster. After all, we can imagine an individual who is violent towards household furniture as being likely to be violent in other respects of their life–perhaps even violent towards other people–but we wouldn’t likely deem this true of someone who finds old pieces of furniture and morphs them into artworks. It would be quite an odd objection to such a practice! Thus, such an explanation cannot succeed.
PROPERTY CONCERNS
In a similar vein, a further consideration would be concerns of property, in that we have indirect duties to animals if they ‘belong’ to someone who is intrinsically valuable. By harming such animals then, I would be wronging the property owner. But this is why I stipulated that the animals being used in the artwork were abandoned. Property concerns of this sort cannot explain the wrongdoing present in Installation, especially since such explanations would seem to level it to about as wrong as collecting 100 abandoned desks and making that into an art sculpture.10
MORAL CHARACTER ITSELF
Some folks are tempted to take a step back from the consequences of developing bad character and instead opt for a view holding that the development and maturation of bad character is wrong in itself. Such a view appeals to us when we consider why there is something morally amiss with developing and feeding sadistic tendencies for instance, even if no bad consequences come of it.11 However such a view needs a bit more fleshing out, for instance, what counts as bad character and what doesn’t? More importantly, how does it attempt to explain the wrongdoing in Installation?
Considerations of sadism for instance won’t explain much given that the artist and the audience are just not interested nor concerned with how much the animals suffer in their gruesome transformation. The artist doesn’t put the animals through tremendous pain for the sake of causing pain, it’s more that he and the audience are just not at all concerned with their wellbeing. They see them as mere things to be used for whatever purpose; much like how I think of desks, cutlery or tubs of paint.
Perhaps Installation depicts a wasteful character? The thought is that those animals could have been put to use more effectively, and making them into an artwork is just a ‘waste of resources’, and committing such a wasteful act is to display the development/maturation of bad character.12 Keep in mind that this would make Installation seemingly analogous to the creation of an artwork made out of objects like desks that could have been used more effectively too. If this wasn’t bad enough, it’s not clear how such an explanation of wrongdoing, as weak as it is, could even succeed in the first place. Once we stipulate that–as far as being used–this art installation was the most effective use of ‘resources’, the explanation crumbles.13 Such talk may sound callous to many readers. But it must be noted that such talk would be appropriate if we thought animals were mere things. This is after all how we talk about things like desks and pots of paint–but such talk strikes me as totally inappropriate for animals, and hopefully, it strikes you as such too. Something else to notice with this view of moral character is that such an explanation doesn’t seem to take the level of wrongness as seriously as it should. The actions taken by the artist in Installation strike me as very wrong and considerations of character don’t seem to reach the level of wrongdoing presented to us in the thought experiment.
MORAL CHARACTER & WRONGING THYSELF
Let us consider an unorthodox Kantian view put forward by Svoboda, where the development and/or maturation of bad character is an instance of wronging oneself.14 On this view indirect obligations to animals are grounded in the direct obligations to ourselves to develop certain kinds of moral dispositions. But unlike previous Kantian views, this isn’t focused on the consequences of the development of bad character. What we ought to do, at least when it comes to our dispositions, is this:
… adopt a maxim whereby one strives to develop morally virtuous dispositions.
Then:
… given a direct duty to oneself to develop morally virtuous dispositions, one has an indirect duty to abstain from treating non-humans in ways that erode or weaken one’s virtuous dispositions, such as actions that cause unnecessary harm to animals or plant-life.
T. Svoboda. A Reconsideration of Indirect Duties Regarding Non-Human Organisms
On its face it’s not clear which is true for this view: will certain treatments of animals always lead one to wrong oneself, or will those same treatments of animals usually lead one to wrong oneself.15 If the latter is true, then certain individuals could get away with treating animals abhorrently. Imagine if the artist and audience in Installation were like this. The explanation of wrongdoing in Installation would have to appeal to the duties the artist has to himself–to foster virtuous dispositions. Thus, I will assume that this view holds that the acts depicted in Installation (at least) will always lead to the undermining of virtuous dispositions and/or the development of vicious character. It may even be said that the audience acts wrongly to themselves by deriving interest from such a horrendous scene, and ought to take concern in the suffering of the animals–of course, only to respect themselves, and not because the animals deserve such consideration. A supporter of Installation may push back by arguing that in creating this ‘sculpture’, the artist has in fact acted in such a way that encourages virtuous moral dispositions. The artist may wish to create interesting artworks out of concern for the public. The supporter could conclude that the artist is acting in the interests of others in his community and this compassionate act (as they may see it) entails that the artist is treating himself with adequate respect. Is this a reasonable argument, and would this be a good argument in favour of the permissibility/obligatoriness of the acts committed in Installation considering this specific unorthodox Kantian view?
In tandem with these considerations, we must clarify what sorts of acts against animals will always (or might) lead to the undermining of virtuous dispositions or the development of vices. Svoboda already holds that causing unnecessary animal suffering is one example. But what about treating animals as mere means, i.e. treating animals as mere things? Perhaps this leads to the conclusion that even if animals were things, we should still treat them as ends per se, even if for our own sake. It should be noted that Svoboda has suggested that it might entail that one ought to be a practical Vegetarian or Vegan.16
All of these considerations bring us to a much deeper concern for this view–that of self-defeat. According to this view, we should treat animals in ways that lead us to maintain/strengthen virtuous dispositions and avoid developing vices out of direct obligations to ourselves. But should we treat animals with kindness only for the sake of ourselves? By this, I don’t mean to ask whether there are good reasons to treat animals nicely for their own sake (though that strikes me as a critical question to ask). Instead, what I mean, is this: Is it even possible to maintain virtuous dispositions and avoid developing vices by treating animals nicely solely out of concern for ourselves? Surely in order to develop virtuous dispositions in our treatment of animals we would have to focus on treating the animals nicely for their own sake. There seems to be an air of impossibility and self-defeat in the practice of treating an animal nicely solely to respect oneself by maintaining virtuous dispositions. Imagine someone treating a pig with kindness, but not for the pig’s sake, but for the sake of maintaining a disposition of beneficence and only in order to respect themselves. So perhaps this view entails that we have obligations to treat animals nicely for their own sake? If this weren’t true then it’s hard to see how we could even show the respect we owe ourselves in our treatment of animals. But according to this view, we have no direct obligations to animals. That is, we have no obligation to treat pigs nicely for their own sake. The problem can be summarised as follows:
If we are to maintain /develop virtuous dispositons and avoid developing vices in our treatment of animals (and other things like plants) we ought to treat them nicely for their own sake.
But since this view holds that we have no direct obligations to animals, we could not have an obligation to treat animals nicely for their own sake.
Thus we do and do not have an obligation to treat animals nicely for their own sake under this view.
Let me offer an analogy for what this view is championing:
Imagine a demon were to command you to treat a plant with kindness for its own sake, but only for the sake of a person he will harm if you fail to meet his command.
At first, it seems as if we have an indirect obligation to treat the plant with kindness for the sake of the individual whose life is in danger. But upon closer inspection, we discover that the command is impossible to follow. If I were to treat the plant with kindness just for the sake of the person I would have failed. But that is precisely what I would be morally expected to do given this Kantian view. Paradoxically, one is only able to perform their duty by removing themselves from the very grounds of that duty. Treating an animal with kindness for their own sake requires not just doing it for some other sake.
In addition to these problems, this view suffers from further difficulties. For instance, it doesn’t seem able to explain the wrongdoing of committing some act that unknowingly results in some terrible consequences concerning animals. This is because committing such acts needn’t undermine one’s virtuous dispositions or lead to the development of vices. We can imagine someone pressing an unmarked button thinking it’s a dud, when in reality it causes the incredibly painful deaths of hundreds or thousands of animals. We can (and should!) say that this person shouldn’t have pressed the button17 even though the button pressing had no obvious effect on their dispositions.18
Moreover, it seems this view will determine that treating animals in horrible ways will be of the same sort of wrongness present in acts like the wanton destruction of plants. Of course, the level of degree can differ depending on the specifics, but the type of wrongdoing ought to remain the same if we are to take this view seriously. Much like how certain instances of property damage can be worse than others, they are all still of the same type of wrongdoing as other forms of property damage, all else being equal. In our case, it would be different levels of how much you have wronged yourself.
Treating plants with kindness for their own sake may also foster a sort of disposition that makes individuals want to save them over strangers, which would be something of a vice under this view. This example might be a little ridiculous, but I still think it portrays an important point. It seems possible that treating plants (and other things) with genuine kindness could also lead to the development of immoral dispositions. Imagine someone took extreme care to treat their plant with respect–watering it every day, pruning it, talking to it, etc. We could imagine such an individual forming a bond with the plant to the degree that would make them want to save it from a fire or a flood, perhaps even at the cost of not saving a stranger. If this criticism is on the mark, then it seems the same sorts of acts that supposedly encourage virtuous dispositions could also lead to the development of vices. Assuming it would be a vice under this view to want to save a plant over a person.
My final criticism revolves around asking whether treating animals with kindness is just the same type of moral action as ensuring one eats a healthy diet and exercises regularly. Plausibly such acts portray respectful treatment we owe to ourselves (if we owe anything to ourselves). Other plausible examples might include not treating oneself as a mere means. It doesn’t strike me that treating animals with kindness is just like these acts. But this would have to be the case if we are to accept this specific Kantian view, as such an act would just be one of the ways we show respect to ourselves.
In the end, it may be the case that acting morally and/or developing virtuous dispositions is something we owe to ourselves19–that’s fair enough, but this view still fails in its conception of indirect duties towards animals, (in tandem with its other problems).
WRONGING GOD
One view might be that the act of animal torture, whilst it doesn’t wrong the animals involved, wrongs God because they are his property; or that since such acts go against God’s commands, we would be wronging God to commit them. However, this would be akin to treating desks nicely if God commanded us to do so. This view denies that we have any direct obligations to animals themselves after all. Animals and desks under this view are both things, and thus a command against doing damage to desks could be just as plausible as one regarding animals. If this wasn’t bad enough, this view doesn’t seem to forbid the idea that God could make acts like that in installation morally permissible–without any changes to the act itself. God could also, under this view, make it permissible and perhaps even obligatory to torture animals. It could, morally speaking, be no different to God making it permissible or obligatory to break desks. But is this at all plausible? It doesn’t seem to me that God–an all-loving and all-good being–could ever command or permit such treatment of animals on its own. If we take this line of thought seriously–that God couldn’t make such acts, all by themselves, obligatory or permissible–then it seems that we should adopt the view that animals are not things or mere property. They are individuals who can be wronged in our treatment of them.
This line of thought naturally leads us to a Euthyphro style question, what reasons would God have for commanding and/or permitting different sorts of actions towards animals? Those who think animals can be wronged have a straightforward response–animals are not things and thus deserve our respect. God knows this and thus commands us to respect their dignity. Whilst I’m unaware of which theist views support this notion, I think it would be the sort we should favour if theism were true. This is also putting aside the topic of our confidence in the belief that God exists. For those who believe that the existence of morality necessarily depends on God, it would entail that if God did not exist, then acts like that depicted in Installation (or any other possible scenario) couldn’t be wrong–but surely this is false.20 If one’s worry is about holding onto moral objectivism without God, then you’ve got good company. That being said, there are a plethora of moral philosophers who endorse all sorts of moral objectivist views that don’t rely on God.21
BRUTE WRONGDOING & MORAL PARTICULARISM
I don’t mean this to be understood in the sense ‘brutal’, rather it is meant to refer to something that is wrong without further explanation. Something is ‘brute’ in this sense if there is no further fundamental explanation. For example, someone may explain the wrongdoing by describing the very scene we see in Installation. It’s wrong because the artist abducts the animals and puts them through tremendous suffering–they might say. This view seems to be a sort of radical moral particularism, where there are no general or absolute moral rules. No act is–at least in principle–intrinsically right or wrong.22 It will always completely depend on the circumstances. I worry that this sort of view threatens a very plausible picture of morality–that we always owe it to valuable individuals to treat them with respect. The notion of individuals as ends per se. If a radical moral particularism is correct, then there cannot be any permanent importance in treating others with respect. It seems to undermine the entire plausibility of the view that anyone could be an end per se. After all, if someone is an end per se, it just follows that they are always owed respect.23 To make matters worse, since this view would deny that the act depicted in Installation wronged those animals, and if my previous criticisms are correct, it may additionally follow that it’s impossible to wrong anybody under this view. Widen the scope beyond animals for a second–this includes everyone. This is because, in order to wrong someone, there must be a right way to treat them for their own sake, as opposed to there just being a right way to treat them.24 This difference is subtle but important. For example, there can be morally right ways to treat desks (i.e. property concerns), but it would be odd (and most likely mistaken) to say we could wrong them–because there is no right way to treat it for its own sake.
We can only wrong those whom we owe direct obligations to25 and part of what it means to be an end per se, just is to be owed direct obligations.26 Thus, we couldn’t wrong anyone. It may be that (under this view) we have direct obligations to morality itself rather than to individuals or anything else. Even though we could still be obligated to act morally under this view, it seems to focus away from what matters–our treatment of others for their own sake (and our treatment of ourselves for our own sake). There is of course still much more to say about a view like this27, but for now, I will assume its implications are radical and/or implausible enough to doubt it, if not reject it outright.
ANIMALS AS MERE RECEPTACLES
Some with inclinations towards the moral importance of reducing animal suffering may instead opt for an explanation rooted in the concerns of animal wellbeing, albeit without attributing any value to animals themselves. It is not the animals themselves that are of value, but rather their experiences–thus animals are mere instruments in this sense. To picture what this view is suggesting, Regan provides the following analogy in his book:
Suppose we think of [animals28] as cups into which may be poured either sweet liquids (pleasures) or bitter brews (pains). At any given time, each cup will have a certain hedonic flavour: the liquid it contains will be more or less sweet or bitter.
Regan. The Case for Animal Rights. 205-206
The cups themselves have no value, it is rather what’s inside the cups that matters. The proponent of this view would then presumably explain the wrongdoing in Installation using a utility calculus. But this of course opens up a can of vicious utility monsters.29 What if the utility gained from making such an artwork–looking at pure abstract utility calculations–was optimific? Such practices of turning animals into artworks, when optimific, would then become morally permissible, or even obligatory. If we are to take a pure utility calculus seriously, we must be willing to admit that there exists an amount of inspiration and happiness that would outweigh the suffering of the animals–a certain number of civilians who find the artwork intriguing–making the act morally permissible or even obligatory. Thus, if the wrongdoing in Installation is very serious, a proponent of this view must agree that the utility calculus is way off, and strongly toward the negative. But let’s imagine that the artist never unveils the artwork to the public. Does the whole act become much more wrong? A proponent of this view should agree that it would, as it forgoes bringing about more utility in the world while the expenditure of negative utility is very high.3031
To highlight this issue in a more sadistic light, consider an animal torturer who films himself harming animals for the pleasure of a sadistic audience. There exists some number of viewers that would tip the scales–making the act permissible/obligatory.
Thus, I’m not confident that such utility explanations will succeed in explaining the wrongdoing in Installation. Such explanations must fail if it turns out the act of the artist was optimific. For clarification, I regard this view as an indirect obligation view, as it suggests that we only have obligations concerning animals due to our obligations to the utility calculus (valuable states of affairs) rather than the individual animals who merely feed into the calculus. I do want to be clear however–I don’t think this criticism applies to all consequentialist views.32
A proponent of this view might also hold that the positive utility animals can offer the utility calculus is important too, and thus we have indirect obligations to make the lives of animals go better for them. But such ideas seem to entail some unintuitive implications given its affirmation that animals are mere receptacles. For one, it suggests animals are completely replaceable since they have no value of their own. They are merely vessels for experiences. Thus there would be nothing wrong with replacing one animal with another, so long as they have the same capacity for experiences (utility). With this in mind, it becomes reasonable to ask whether animals should always be replaced with younger ones. They have more utility to offer after all. Furthermore, should animals all be replaced by ones with more capacity for experience? Or is bringing about more positive utility not always obligatory? Finally, would this view ordinarily condemn animal killing practices that don’t immediately replace the killed animals? If so, wouldn’t this seem to make animal farming, at least when it comes to killing animals for food, practically ethically impossible?
A further concern is that this view gets value the wrong way around.33 It designates that, at least in the case of animals, we have direct duties to the utility calculus and not to the individuals themselves. So if I took my dog to the vet for their own sake, I’m getting it wrong. What I really ought to be concerned with is making those utility numbers tick up. But it seems mistaken to suggest this is what we truly ought to be concerned with. When taking my dog to the vet, what I should be concerned with is his well-being, for his own sake. If I’m ever thinking about pleasure and pains, it’s always about what would be good for those who would be experiencing it. In this sense, experiences wouldn’t matter per se, rather, experiences matter, if they do, just because those who can have experiences matter per se.34 A final consideration that strengthens this verdict is that acting out of the best interests of one’s animal companions, for their own sake, doesn’t strike us as overblown treatment. It’s not excessive or ridiculous to care about them for their own sake–it seems to me completely appropriate treatment.
OVERBLOWN TREATMENT
The idea that we should treat animals in certain ways for their own sake on its own has strong plausibility. Reflect on the act of taking your animal companion to the vet but for their own sake. It doesn’t strike us as what we might call ‘over the top’ or ‘overblown’ treatment. If some treatment of a thing is overblown (excessive, ridiculous, over the top, etc), no one is obligated to treat it in that way for it’s own sake. For example, keeping a rock warm for the rock’s own sake, or giving a used-up paint tube a retirement for the sake of the paint tube. It’s over the top because we’d be treating things in some way for the thing’s own sake, most crucially, when we’re not required to35–such treatment constitutes treating the rock as an end per se, when it is only instrumentally valuable. A rock is a thing, and thus treating it as if it weren’t a thing strikes us as overblown. We’d be treating it as something more valuable than it is. Korsgaard presents a good example of a similar notion in the following passage:
… imagine someone who refuses to send his old car off to be mined for spare parts and scrap metal, citing his gratitude for the long service it has given him. Instead he insists on keeping it in a well-heated garage, and washing it every Sunday, even though he can no longer use it. We would think this person was dotty.
C.M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures. 103
Whilst we should agree that there could be a plausible story to tell about wanting to keep such a car around–perhaps he has many fond memories of it for instance. But I think it’s reasonable to believe that it would be overblown for him to give his car a ‘retirement’ for the car’s own sake. Such treatment strikes us as overblown because it depicts treating a mere thing as an end-in-itself. To repeat another earlier example, imagine someone giving their used-up paint tubes a retirement instead of recycling them or throwing them away. Such behaviour strikes me as quite overblown. Do they really need to give all of their used-up paint tubes a retirement? No. Used-up paint tubes are mere things.
Overview
I cannot pretend to have refuted all possible explanations of wrongdoing that concern animals without direct obligations. However, I think I have provided ample support for the view that animals are ends per se–that we have direct obligations to them and that indirect obligation views are quite lackluster. The main arguments I’ve put forward above can be summarised as the following:
The Argument from Direct Obligations
If some view cannot adequately explain (prominent) cases of immoral behaviour involving the treatment of animals, then those views are false.
If indirect obligation views to animals are false36, then we do not merely have indirect obligations to animals.
But, if we do not merely have indirect obligations towards animals, then we must have direct obligations to them.
If we have direct obligations to animals, then animals are ends per se.
Views that hold that we only have indirect obligations to animals cannot adequately explain (prominent) cases of immoral behaviour involving the treatment of animals.
So, animals are ends per se. (from 1-5)
Put another way: Given that serious wrongdoing occurs in Installation, and indirect obligation views to animals fail to adequately explain this–a direct obligation view to animals is true. At least as long as we maintain that serious wrongdoing has still occurred in the thought experiment. But if such a view is correct, then animals are ends per se.
I take 1 to be an analytic truth37 given that if some view cannot account for wrongdoing that occurs, then that view (and others relevantly like it) must be mistaken. Such views are, by definition, not successful. I’m not suggesting that our working moral theories must currently account for all our intuitions, all I’m arguing is that if some act is certainly wrong, the correct moral theory must be able to account for that. It seems that those who reject premise 1 are stuck with the idea that if their theory cannot explain some legitimate wrongdoing, then their theory (as is, and without development) isn't necessarily mistaken. There is a serious concern with this view in that if some action is indeed wrong, and their theory cannot account for this, then they must either accept that their theory (as is) is mistaken or that the action isn't actually wrong. Either way, premise 1 still stands.
2 is another analytic truth as it just lays out the remaining possibility. If indirect obligations views are mistaken, then we do not merely have indirect obligations to animals. This is just what it means for indirect obligation views towards animals to be mistaken since indirect obligation views just affirm that we only have indirect obligations towards animals.
3 is another analytic truth as it just follows from there being more than mere indirect obligations to animals. If there are more than mere indirect obligations to animals, then this means that we have more obligations to animals than ones that just concern them, but are rather directed at them.
4 is an analytic truth since there are two sorts of value one can possess, and both sorts are tied to whether one is owed direct obligations or not. If one is a thing then they aren’t owed anything directly, and thus we only have indirect obligations to them. On the other hand, if we have direct obligations towards someone, they must be an end per se, since all it means to be an end per se is to be an intrinsically valuable individual who is owed certain treatments for their (the individual’s) own sake. Direct obligations just are the sort of obligations that are owed directly to such individuals (ends per se). We can think of it as the dichotomy of value between that of a thing or an end per se. If you’re owed direct obligations, then you cannot be a thing and thus are an end per se. This is because things are not owed anything directly by definition.
I’ve argued in favour of 5 in the previous section, claiming that appeals to…
Consequences,
Property concerns,
Wronging oneself,
Radical particularism,
God, and
Animals as mere receptacles…
… are all unsatisfactory in explaining the wrongdoing in Installation, in tandem with other problems. We must either [1] derive another indirect obligation view that doesn’t suffer from these defects, or [2] argue that at least one of the indirect obligation views is salvageable, or [3] accept that direct obligation views are needed to explain the wrongdoing that happens in various actions involving animals and affirm 5.
6 just follows from all previous premises.
The Argument from Wronging Animals
If animals are things, then they couldn’t be wronged
But, animals can be wronged
So, animals are not things (from 1-2)
If animals are not things, then they are ends per se
So, animals are ends per se (from 3-4)
I take 1 and 4 to be analytic truths, and I have argued in favour of 2 in the section above. All other premises simply follow from these three.
1 is an analytic truth since things cannot be owed any direct moral obligations. That’s just what being a ‘thing’ entails! Things could only be wronged if there were a right way to treat them for their own sake, but this requires them to be owed direct obligations. The first premise is essentially equivalent to: “If there is no right way to treat animals for their own sake, then they couldn’t be wronged.”
4 is an analytic truth since there are two sorts of value one can possess. One is either a thing or not. In other words, one either matters for one’s own sake, or not (and only matters for some other sake than themselves). This is the dichotomy: being that of a thing or an end per se. Thus, if one is not a thing (they can be wronged, are owed direct obligations, etc) one is an end per se. The only exception may be on views that insist nothing is intrinsically valuable in the sense I mean, and thus, nothing is instrumentally valuable either. In this sense, nothing would have the sorts of value I refer to38 and everything would be valueless. With this in mind, I could simply change the premises of the argument as follows:
1. If animals are things (or valueless), then they couldn’t be wronged
2. But, animals can be wronged
3.So, animals are not things (or valueless) (from 1-2)
4. If animals are not things (or valueless), then they are ends per se
5. So, animals are ends per se (from 3-4)
A different defense of 1 will be needed, given this new argument. Take for instance a view that denies that anything has objective intrinsic value and that the only sort of value in existence is sentimental value. This would fall under the valueless label I present as it denies that anything has the sort of moral value I refer to.
A new defence of 1 would have to demonstrate that such (as I call them) valueless views cannot ground the idea that we can actually wrong others in our treatment of them. Such a defence might go something along these lines: Consider a simple moral subjectivist view, in which the only sort of “moral value” individuals could possess is imbued by the sentiments of others. I think it would be implausible to suggest that this view could ground the idea that we can wrong such individuals in our treatment of them. For instance, it strikes me quite strongly that we could wrong someone, even if we didn’t care about them. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem like I could wrong a desk–no matter how much I happened to care about it. So if individuals like humans and nonhumans have no innate value–just like the desk–then it’s hard to see how we could wrong them at all.
The Argument from Overblown Treatment
If animals are things, then treating them in some way for their own sake is always overblown
But, treating them in some way for their own sake is not always overblown
So, animals are not things (from 1-2)
If animals are not things, then they are ends per se
So, animals are ends per se (from 3-4)
1 is an analytic truth because the reason why some treatment of something is overblown is because it goes above and beyond moral requirements. In other words, by definition, if some treatment of something for its (the things) own sake is overblown, it’s not a moral requirement to treat it in that way for its own sake.
I’ve argued in favour of 2 in the previous section. i.e. Taking your animal companion to the vet and caring about them for their own sake isn’t overblown.
3 follows from the first 2 premises.
4 is an analytic truth in the same sense that 4 is an analytic truth in the Argument from Wronging Animals.
5 just follows from premises 3 and 4.
Cases for Further Reflection
*A word of caution, some of these thought experiments are particularly unpleasant
ONE
Stray; a group of boys come across a stray cat and take her to a secluded area. They proceed to rip her fur out and puncture her eyes, rip her limbs off and shove her in the hot coals of a campfire where she finally perishes.
TWO
Bridge; A man standing on a bridge drops drugged animals off the side one by one for fun. The animals are completely unconscious and thus feel no pain or fear.
But in contrast, suppose that in
Violent Night; A man derives extreme gratification from viewing obscenely violent films. Such films display brutal torture scenes, kidnappings and bodily dismemberments. After watching he destroys his entire TV set with a baseball bat. He then goes on a rampage destroying every other object in his house. There is nobody else around and he does no physical harm to anybody, there aren’t even any neighbours to frighten.
THREE
Halloween House; a man drugs animals, lacerates their unconscious bodies and throws them against the outside of his house to give it a spooky and bloody aesthetic; he never found the look of fake blood particularly scary and believes his new method really sells the horror theme he’s been looking for.
FOUR
Pedestrian; A hefty person is walking along a path when they spot a couple of birds ahead. But rather than slightly adjusting their path to the right, this person tramples the birds instead. Due to this person’s weight, the birds are crushed instantly and feel no pain or fear.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:
Do any of these thought experiments depict the wronging of animals? If yes, how so? Or, if not, do any of these thought experiments convey wrongdoing in general? If so, how might you explain the wrongness presented? Do you think these thought experiments provide strong support for a direct obligation view towards animals?
Is the amount of wrongness present in Violent Night equivalent to the wrongness exhibited in Bridge? Which indirect obligation views would have the most trouble explaining that more wrongdoing occurs in Bridge (if it does)?
PART TWO
Treating Animals as Ends Per Se
I don’t intend to offer a complete account of what it means to treat animals as ends per se. Such a project requires much further philosophizing that I would deem unfit for this particular article. Accounting for such things in tandem with our discussion so far, I think, would only muddy the waters. So I will leave a deep dive into this topic for another time. That being said, I still intend to brush over some of my own musings on what constitutes respecting animals.
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE END-PER-SE
We owe it to those who are ends-per-se not to treat them as mere means.39
Assuming animals cannot provide actual or expected consent in how they are treated, all* usage of animals constitutes treating them as mere means.
This principle, like Kant’s Principle of Humanity40, focuses on the innate wrongness of using others in immoral ways that violate their dignity. This focuses on at least one part of what it means to treat someone as a thing. Let’s return to the example from the beginning: imagine someone kidnapped a person and turned them into an art sculpture. They’ve treated them as a thing, at least in part, by treating them as a mere means.41
Returning to animals, I’ve suggested that all* usage constitutes treating them as mere means. How does that figure, when it seems perfectly okay to treat others as means in lots of cases? The thing to take note of here is relevant consent when it comes to using others as a means. For example, you use college professors as a means to gain knowledge if you study at university, and there doesn’t seem anything at all wrong with this. But what if you kidnapped your favorite professor so you could learn even more over the weekend? Clearly there would be something wrong with this. There is something important about consent when it comes to treating someone permissibly as a means and impermissibly as a mere means. This is not to say that people could consent to any kind of treatment and be permissibly treated in that way42–I don’t wish to settle that discussion here. All I intend to highlight is that without actual or expected consent, it doesn’t seem okay to use others as a means to an end. Unless, perhaps, they are the end? For instance, it seems permissible to use a chicken to acquire eggs, which you then sell, in order to afford an important medical procedure for that chicken, provided you have no other feasible means of acquiring the funds. If this is plausible, then treating animals as a means for some other sake than themselves constitutes treating them as a mere means. All usage when not done for the animal’s own sake, violates their dignity. Treating them in these ways is thus, pro tanto wrong.4344
MORAL CONCLUSIONS
If this view is correct, it follows that killing and/or using animals for goods and services is pro tanto wrong and disrespectful–no matter how painless or “humane”. They are being used as mere means to the ends of farmers and consumers.45 Not only does this label intensive animal agricultural practices, animal sports, etc. as immoral, but also more local and less intensive operations, i.e. using backyard hens to acquire eggs. Thus, regardless of the method of exploitation, we ought to refrain from killing and using animals for goods and other services.
On a more controversial note, I think this view may also provide an adequate ground for the wrongness of treating dead bodies as things too. For instance, the selling, buying, and eating of dead animals. A non-paradigmatic form of ethical vegetarianism would immediately follow. Non-paradigmatic in that it’s not tied to the actual, and/or risk of causation of consumer choices. Buying, selling, and eating meat becomes wrong in and of itself. The same goes for other products made from the bodies of animals. It should be noted again that this is certainly a much more controversial point. But, given the merits of the view, I’m tempted to think such controversy may be overrated.
ROOM FOR POSITIVE RIGHTS
I think being an end per se plausibly underlies the grounds for a variety of positive rights, and not just negative ones (like you aren’t to be treated as a mere means). Such rights could include a right to aid, a right to freedom from bodily harm, etc. Consider the Pedestrian thought experiment for a plausible support of a right to freedom from bodily harm for animals. Such situations involve treating animals in certain ways that are grossly wrong but don’t involve using them.46 An additional note is that such rights also bring up questions of how we should address topics like animal predation in the wild. The question being: do animals have a right to be rescued from being killed by other animals? This is a very complicated topic and deserves it’s own seperate discussion–but for now I will move on, as my main intention is to highlight that there may be room for more than negative rights under conceptions of individuals as ends-per-se.
INTENTION & REALITY
Intention matters in tandem with matching up with reality. For instance, imagine someone who believes that killing an animal is what’s best for them when it is not best for them. Such concerns raise questions like whether such an individual is blameworthy for going ahead with the act and such, however, given our concerns here, the main question is this: Is such treatment disrespectful? I think the answer is yes. In contrast, we can imagine a situation of the opposite nature, where someone believes that killing an animal is in fact what’s best for them when it is, but they intend to kill them for some other reason. For example, imagine someone who ends the life of their elderly dog because they can’t be bothered taking care of them anymore. Let’s say he believes that putting the dog down is what’s best for them and that putting the dog down is what is best for them. Such an individual still disrespects their elderly dog with the intent to put them down for some other sake than the dog’s–even if euthanizing the dog is morally called for in this situation.47
THE MINIMAL SCOPE
The minimal scope of animals who I think are ends per se are those of the sentient kind. This isn’t to say that this view isn’t open to insentient animals (amongst other possibilities) counting as ends per se too, it’s just that at a minimum, it includes all sentient beings.
References
Shafer-Landau, R. (2023). The Fundamentals of Ethics. 6th ed: 186-207
Kerstein, S. (2023). Treating Persons as Means. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Svoboda, T. (2014). A Reconsideration of Indirect Duties Regarding Non-Human Organisms. Fairfield University
T, Regan. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. 205-206
Korsgaard, C. (2020). On the Value of People and Animals. The Philosopher, Vol.108, No. 1
Korsgaard, C. (2018). Fellow Creatures. 103
The term is very much inspired by the concept of Kant’s End-in-Itself/End-in-Themselves. Though I don’t intend for it to be exactly the same (hence the slight name change). I want the concept of the End-Per-Se to be more focused on a more fundamental notion of intrinsic value that individuals possess.
There are two ways I could categorize things that don’t matter for their own sake. For instance, things are merely instrumentally valuable iff they can be used for some intrinsically valuable end. But if we are nihilists about this sort of objective value, the alternative would be that everything is valueless, at least in and of itself. It would be that objectively speaking, nothing has value, but value (of a different sort) is still imbued through subjective whims like sentiment.
A categorical imperative is an important moral requirement that applies to all moral agents regardless of their desires. This is contrasted with hypothetical imperatives that state that if you want X, then do Y. Whether you should do Y is entirely contingent on you wanting X. Not so for categorical imperatives–there is no if, there is only do.
At least sentient ones
I know of individuals who would take this latter option.
*Not including moral error theorists. They could still hold that if moral realism were true, certain acts like that depicted in Installation would be wrong.
All rational and autonomous beings (homo sapien or not).
See various slaughterhouse workers who kill animals and have said that the experience made them less compassionate and more violent to others. Also, see individuals who move on from harming animals to harming people.
They are after all (in their eyes) merely treating things as things. It makes sense to suggest that if they have this understanding, they wouldn’t necessarily be led to treat ends per se as things in tandem.
This is because both could/would involve the same level of property violations.
Unless of course, we count the maturation of bad character as a bad consequence.
A proponent of a view like this might also add that wasting ‘resources’ is also wrong in itself (or something like this).
Remember, it was enjoyed by all the public in the thought experiment, it’s not as if the artist is just throwing the animals into the ocean. Though on this view, if such treatment were useful (enough) to some end, it would be hard to see how it could be objected to without saying that animals aren’t things.
See Svoboda, T. (2014)
Or perhaps it is a mix? i.e. animal torture always develops vicious dispositions whilst killing animals usually develops vicious dispositions. If this view is the way to go it would have to be argued why certain acts against animals are always going to lead individuals to wrong themselves and others aren’t.
The author derives this implication from the obligation not to cause unnecessary harm to animals (and plants). But if we’re also obligated to treat animals as if they were ends per se, the practical implication of Vegetarianism/Veganism would certainly follow.
I think this would remain true (that he shouldn’t have pressed the button) even if we want to say that this individual isn’t morally blameworthy for the deaths he caused.
A defender of this view may want to push back and suggest that such button-pushing would in fact be an instance of self-disrespect since it leads to the development of an arrogant and/or careless disposition (or something along those lines). I grant that such defenders could accept this line of reasoning–but at a substantial cost. For instance, we can imagine the same individual pushing the button, but this time nothing comes of it. The defender of this view would have to say that each of the possibilities presented (a button pushing that causes terrible consequences and a button pushing that does nothing) were equally as wrong concerning one’s obligations to oneself. It strikes me quite strongly that there is much more reason not to push the button in the first scenario than in the second (if there is any reason not to push the button in the second scenario at all).
Or at least, is something worth pursuing for its own sake.
Thanks to a friend of mine for reminding me of this point.
For instance, Russ Shafer-Landau, John Bengson, Terence Cuneo (who is religious himself), Tim Scanlon, Derek Parfit, etc.
For example, there would be nothing wrong in principle with stealing, framing the innocent, or torture.
This is compatible with the view that it can still be morally called for/required to disrespect someone for a more morally important end. That we always owe it to others to treat them with respect, only needs to amount to it being pro tanto wrong to disrespect them, as opposed to absolutely wrong.
I will also add that: if we can wrong someone there must also be a right way to treat relevantly connected things for the sake of the individual in question. This is clear in cases of breaking medical equipment that someone is using to keep themselves alive, as well as in cases of property damage.
After all, if we don’t owe someone anything directly, then there is no right way to treat them for their own sake.
This point should be read as the following: If we owe direct obligations to X, then X is an end-per-se.
For example, what arguments supporters of the view have put forward in favour of it and the arguments detractors have developed against it.
I’ve replaced Regan’s words [moral agents and patients] with [animal] for the sake of clarity.
‘Utility monsters’ are the given name of certain thought experiments that attempt to derive implausible moral conclusions given the doctrine that one ought to maximize utility. i.e. The amount of pleasure I get out of burning your house down outweighs the suffering it causes you, thus I am permitted, and perhaps even obligated to commit the act.
Since it doesn’t even attempt to outbalance the negative utility created, in tandem with not committing some act that could bring about positive utility in the world.
But to be honest, encouraging others to be inspired by such an ‘artwork’ would be an immoral act by my lights as it means to declare animals as mere things. This would of course be alongside considerations such as it’s wrong to treat animals as mere means–mere art materials.
Unless they all determine that individuals are mere receptacles for utility, but I’m highly doubtful that this is the case.
See Korsgarrd 2020
I admit an in-between view is possible, i.e. both individuals and experiences matter per se. But the idea that experiences matter because individuals matter helps to convey the point I am making here.
This isn’t to say that every time we act in some way we’re not required to that we’re acting in an overblown way. It’s more that, not being morally required, is always a necessary condition of some treatment being overblown, rather than a sufficient one. For instance, supererogatory acts are not morally required but are not overblown. This naturally leads us to question how we can demarcate between both sorts of acts.
I think there is a way to demarcate overblown acts and supererogatory acts. If there is a proper way to treat someone for their own sake at least some of the time, then treating them above and beyond in ways beyond the call of duty isn’t always overblown (perhaps it never is). These individuals would be ends per se. But in comparison with things, treating them in any way for its own sake is always overblown because such things have no rights whatsoever.
If this is accurate then we cannot say that treating an animal with kindness for their own sake is supererogatory as opposed to overblown if someone holds that animals are mere things.
Insofar as they do not account for all the duties or the type of duties we have towards them. This point is to stave off views that deny we have duties of any sort (direct or indirect) i.e. moral error theory. This should also be granted based on accepting premise 5 given that it talks about certain behaviors being wrong.
Something true by necessity, in virtue of logic, and/or by the meanings of terms and/or concepts involved. i.e. If Jack is a bachelor, then Jack has never married. would be an analytic truth (also referred to as a conceptual truth)
Value of the sort that all moral agents have reason to take seriously and into consideration.
See Kant’s Principle of Humanity.
Always treat humanity, yourself included, as an end, and never merely as a means.
Humanity = Any rational and autonomous individual, group, etc.
I say in part because there are probably other ways in which the person has been treated as a thing.
i.e. Getting someone to ‘consent’ to committing some act for you because you notice they’re in a desperate situation and you can take advantage of this to get them to do something they ordinarily wouldn’t consent to.
Another example might be someone consenting to be killed by someone else for gratification.
I would like to thank a friend of mine for reminding me to highlight this point. Something is pro tanto wrong if there are always strong considerations against acting in that way. Consider the act of lying. If lying is pro tanto wrong, then what we mean is that generally speaking, there is a strong reason not to steal, even if in some cases such considerations are outweighed by more important ones. For example, you should lie if doing so will save someone’s life.
This is how I imagine this playing out. Individuals who are ends per se have a right not to be used, but they can plausibly waive this right by providing adequate consent (at least in various sorts of vases). So, if someone lacks the capacity to provide such consent, or is otherwise unable to provide it for other reasons (i.e. language barriers), they cannot waive this right not to be used. And thus, using them violates their rights.
Folks who favour the view that farming animals is being done for animals, who think that bringing animals into existence and giving them a decent life is a moral obligation (or at least morally permitted) aren’t off the hook. They still intend to use currently existing animals as mere means to bring more animals into existence where the vicious cycle of use and abuse continues.
A further problem plagues this view, in that if the lives of animals are valuable, then surely it is also wrong to kill them. This is only a ‘problem’ in the sense that folks who often utilise arguments like these are often interested in defending certain animal farming practices. But if we owe it directly to animals to bring them into existence (if we can even make sense of this), then we would also owe it to them not to treat them as mere means. They are not merely replaceable as a proponent of this pro-farming view would have to believe.
I would include hunting here as well (especially of the recreational kind).
I will just assume this for the sake of argument. Obviously, if euthanasia is impossible (i.e. it’s impossible to morally kill someone for their own sake) such treatment couldn’t be morally called for.