Travis' Tangle: A Response

Defending my arguments against error theory and subjectivism. A response to TravisTalks' accusation of normative entanglement (amongst other things).

Travis right now ;) Image created by Midjourney.

To begin

Travis Talks

has accused my arguments of normative entanglement.

Recently I wrote an article about certain styles of arguments against metaethical views that have sometimes been accused of being question begging. For example, moral error theory is mistaken since it would entail that there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide. Essentially, I argue that pointing to some unacceptable entailment of a view is fair game in undermining the plausibility of those views.

Travis claims my arguments are mistaken–but not because they’re question begging. Rather, they’re mistaken because they rely on the rhetorical ambiguity of ‘normative entanglement’ (amongst other things). This accusation amounts to the claim that the premises in my arguments are misleading, and once they’re ‘properly’ understood they’ll seem much less plausible. A further component of ‘normative entanglement’ that I’m charged with is that my arguments saddle anti-realist views with normative implications that they aren’t really burdened with.

This is quite the accusation. Let me show you how it’s mistaken.

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The Intention Behind My Arguments

These are the two arguments Travis accuses of normative entanglement:

The Genocide Argument Against Error Theory

1. If moral error theory is true, then there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide.

2. But, there is something wrong with genocide.

3. So, error theory is false.

The Rescue Argument Against Subjectivism¹

1. If moral subjectivism is true, then someone doesn’t have to rescue a drowning child if they don’t care to.

2. But, such an individual would be required to save the child (all else being equal).

3. So, moral subjectivism is false.

I will refer to these arguments as the Genocide argument and the Rescue argument respectively.

I want to outline how I’ve been interpreting these arguments thus far. Whilst I claim in my previous article that these arguments can be used in favour of moral realism (albeit indirectly, e.g. process of elimination), it would be a mistake to say these arguments can only be used by moral realists.

Take the Genocide argument for instance. I think subjectivists can also make use of it, and without contradiction. If this is accurate, then the 2nd premise in the Genocide argument should be just as embraceable to a subjectivist as it is to a moral realist.

An Analogous Argument Against Realism

I think it will be helpful to consider a relevantly similar argument, except one targeted at moral realism.

The Genocide Argument Against Realism

1. If moral realism is true, then there is nothing wrong with genocide.
   → Let’s just suppose this is true.

2. But, there is something wrong with genocide.

3. So, moral realism is false.

Now, if premise one was true, then I would take this to be a very compelling argument against moral realism. Not only that, but I think this should be a compelling argument for those who are non-realists too, such as subjectivists, relativists, and so forth. Of course, this argument isn’t open to all metaethical theories, e.g. error theorists would deny premise 2 since nothing is wrong or right under their view.

But, if we interpret this argument in the style favoured by Travis, this argument no longer works as intended. (More on this at the end).

An Aside

Before moving on, I do want to admit that I’m not sure whether the Rescue argument is valid. I’m not entirely sure how nested conditionals affect the validity of modus tollens arguments when it’s contained in the consequent.¹ So let me offer what I think is essentially the same argument in spirit:

The Rescue Argument Against Subjectivism (New and Improved)

1. If subjectivism is true, then anyone who doesn’t care to rescue drowning children doesn’t have to rescue drowning children.

2. But, they do have to rescue drowning children (all else being equal).

3. So, subjectivism is false.

This is the Rescue argument that I will refer to from now on. This change on it’s own does not determine if Travis’ criticisms fail or not.

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Travis’ Entanglement

The Genocide Argument

Travis’ main criticism against the Genocide and Rescue argument is that if we interpret “wrong” in the way that error theorists / subjectivists do, then both arguments becomes much less compelling. Consider Travis’ interpretation of the Genocide argument:

Travis’ Interpretation of the Genocide Argument

1. If error theory is true, then there is nothing stance independently wrong (or right) in a non-naturalist sense with genocide.

2. But, there is something stance independently wrong in a non-naturalist sense with genocide.

3. So, error theory is false.

I want to admit that–on the face of it–rejecting this premise two doesn’t seem as unacceptable as rejecting premise two in the original Genocide argument.

What Philosophers Think

Travis argues that to say that “rejecting premise two is unacceptable” would entail the view that most philosophers believe something that is unacceptable–most philosophers aren’t non-naturalist moral realists (though many are). According to the phil papers survey that Travis Cites, ~36% of metaethicists are non-naturalists. So, I’d be saying that ~64% of the experts in the field accept a view that is unacceptable. Though I think it’s also important to point out that only ~7% of metaethicists accept error theory.

The realist camps are by far the most popular view amongst metaethicists, both naturalist and non-naturalist views of moral realism beat all other competing theories by at least double. This lead isn’t as pronounced in the data when looking at the views of philosophers in general (as opposed to just metaethicists), e.g. constructivist theories are accepted by ~21% of philosophers, whilst non-naturalist realism is accepted by ~27% of philosophers. Interestingly, error theory and expressivist views are less popular amongst philosophers than metaethicists.

Travis doesn’t take sides on whether we should pay much attention to the survey results, they “just want to be clear on what [I’m] committed to”. Fair enough. But if it means nothing, then this wouldn’t amount to any criticism. However, if it means something, then it should also mean something that most philosophers (and metaethicists in particular) are moral realists. If it means something, then it matters that only ~5% to ~7% of philosophers and metaethicists respectively, are error theorists.

Interpreting the Argument Against Genocide

If you read the previous section on how I intended for my arguments to be utilised, you’d have likely noticed that Travis’ interpretation fails to meet this threshold. For instance, a subjectivist couldn’t accept premise two without contradiction, e.g. subjectivists think that all wrongness (and rightness) is stance dependent.

One might be concerned that, whilst this was the intention behind my arguments, that I didn’t exactly clarify this in my original article. This was something that I had just presumed would be understood from the outset. So, if my arguments were misinterpreted because of this, then fair enough. Although, the arguments were posed as considerations in favour of moral realism because they displayed that non-realist views of two different calibres entail unacceptable results. These arguments are indirect arguments for moral realism.

(From my article)
These absurd and unacceptable results are then utilised as considerations (evidence) against such views, and in favour of moral objectivism–which doesn’t face such entailments.

I thought it went without saying that the same can be said of some other non-realist view that doesn’t face those entailments. These arguments could be used by them too.

Putting this aside, Travis’ interpretation still suffers a fatal flaw–it’s too narrow.²

Too Narrow an Interpretation

Error theory doesn’t only posit that there are no stance independent non-natural facts. It also posits that every other metaethical view is mistaken. I take it that Travis interpreted the premises of my argument as they did because they were supposing that if error theory were true, then we’d have to interpret moral claims in a certain way (namely as a non-naturalist realist). This is indeed how error theorists interpret moral claims. However, it’s still a mistake to interpret the Genocide argument as Travis does.

Interpreting the first premise as…

If error theory is true, then there is nothing stance independently wrong (or right) in a non-naturalist sense with genocide.

… leaves it open to the idea that some other metaethical view could still be right. But, if error theory is true, then no other metaethical theory could be right. If error theory is true, then there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide in any sense, not just in the non-naturalist realist sense. Travis’ interpretation is too narrow in that it doesn’t exclude all of the other metaethical theories.

So, we should reject Travis’ interpretation and accept the Genocide argument as presented. The addition of the “(or right)” in the first premise is also meant to tackle the possibility of someone being mislead to think that error theorists think genocide is morally good–which I think addresses concerns of normative entanglement.

Permissibility and Error Theory

Travis criticises my argument since it doesn’t include the caveat that error theorists don’t think that genocide (or anything else) is permissible. I’m not sure this would in fact be needed, and if interpreted in a natural way, it would also mistaken. Error theorists think every action is permissible in the sense that nothing is wrong. If I were to ask someone if X were permissible, and they told me no, I’d presume they’d meant that X was impermissible. But, error theory denies that impermissibility (wrongness) exists. I think there is an important sense in which if nothing was wrong, then everything would be permissible. For this reason, I think it would in fact be misleading to include the caveat that error theorists deny that genocide is permissible. In a very real sense, error theory posits that anything is permissible, since nothing is impermissible.

Sure, they can still claim that genocide is a terrible idea and oppose it–but they couldn’t claim that it would be morally terrible in any sense. That is reductio enough. This also shows what a rejection of premise two of the Genocide argument amounts to.

Saddling Error Theory With Unacceptable Normative Implications

If you recall, part of Travis’ criticism was that I claim that anti-realist views are saddled with certain normative implications that they aren’t. But, what I’ve argued is implied by error theory is truly entailed by it. Error theory really does imply that there is nothing wrong or right with anything in any sense (which includes genocide). If this is counts as a “normative implication” of the view, then error theory directly implies it.

If what is meant instead, is that my argument claims that error theorists are perfectly in favour of genocide and (maybe even think it’s morally good) then this is just mistaken. At no point does my argument imply this, especially given that I include the “(or right)” caveat. If someone just misinterprets my arguments as presented then that strikes me as their blunder, not mine. If anything, it just goes to show how people find the error theorist view incredibly jarring.

The Rescue Argument

It’s been a while, so let me reiterate the Rescue argument:

The Rescue Argument Against Subjectivism (New and Improved)

1. If subjectivism is true, then anyone who doesn’t care to rescue drowning children doesn’t have to rescue drowning children.

2. But, they do have to rescue drowning children (all else being equal).

3. So, subjectivism is false.

Travis’ main criticism towards this argument is multi-faceted. It follows a similar criticism to that of the Genocide argument, but it also has other components.

Agent / Speaker Subjectivism

Travis also goes on to distinguish between two forms of subjectivism: agent and speaker subjectivism. However, I think the Rescue argument equally applies to both, so I don’t see the need to distinguish between the two.

Travis’ Interpretation

Travis doesn’t offer an exact interpretation to go off, but I will infer what it would look like from their comments about how we should be interpreting certain moral claims in the argument.

Travis says that:

A speaker subjectivist would be committed to saying that if someone who has no desire to save drowning children said “There’s no moral obligation to save children from drowning” they would be saying something true.

But again - let’s be clear on what it means for the speaker subjectivist to say this statement is true. On speaker subjectivism, “There’s no moral obligation to save children from drowning” just amounts to the same proposition as “I have no desire that people save drowning children”. So in saying this statement is true, all the subjectivist is dedicated to is that people who have no desire to save drowning children have no desire to save drowning children.

So with this in mind, let’s reinterpret the Rescue argument:

How I Imagine Travis Interprets the Rescue Argument (based on their article)

1. If subjectivism is true, then anyone who doesn’t care to rescue drowning children doesn’t care to rescue drowning children.
   → I switch out ‘desire’ with ‘care’ (I don’t think the meaning changes in any relevant way).

2. But, those who don’t care, do care.

3. So, subjectivism is false.

Not only is the first premise false, but the second is false as well. The truth of subjectivism doesn’t imply (at least non-trivially) that anyone who doesn’t care to rescue drowning children doesn’t care to rescue drowning children. The consequent is a tautology. The second premise is also false provided that it’s a contradiction.

But this skirts around the very issue I’m trying to focus on–subjectivism’s tying of ‘has to do X’ with ‘caring to do X’ (or possessing some other desire that means one has to do X).

Too Narrow (Again)

The issue is a subjectivist interpretation of premise one is too narrow. It allows for alternative metaethical conceptions of ‘have to’ (by which I mean ‘have a moral requirement’).³ But, if subjectivism is true, then no other metaethical view could be right–no other way of interpreting ‘moral requirement’ / ‘have to’ would be on the table. So, the Rescue argument should not be understood as Travis interprets it.

To reiterate this point, let’s reconsider what Travis says:

“There’s no moral obligation to save children from drowning” just amounts to the same proposition as “I have no desire that people save drowning children”. So in saying this statement is true, all the subjectivist is dedicated to is that people who have no desire to save drowning children have no desire to save drowning children.

[Emphasise added]

But this it not all the subjectivist is dedicated to. They’re dedicated to saying that, for the person who doesn’t care, there is no moral obligation to save children from drowning in any sense whatsoever–they’re not affirming a tautology. The subjectivist must deny that there are alternative avenues (alternative metaethical views) to derive this moral obligation.

What Subjectivism Is

Travis also accuses me of thinking subjectivism is a normative ethical theory since I’m supposing that subjectivism determines that something is right (or wrong) so long as someone approves (or disapproves) of it. (Seriously?)

Travis asserts that subjectivism is just the metaethical theory that when someone says “X is right”, they mean “they approve of X”. But the theory doesn’t only concern itself with moral claims. Subjectivism also asserts that the preferences of individuals determine what the content of morality is (for those individuals). So, yes, subjectivism posits that X is right so long as someone approves of it. If this were false, then I’m not sure how subjectivists would understand moral claims as posited by Travis.

Subjectivism and Calling Out Immorality

Travis criticises my argument saying that subjectivists can still coherently judge the actions of others. For instance, subjectivists can still say that someone who doesn’t rescue children has acted immorally (from their perspective), even if that person doesn’t care about rescuing children, even if that person lacks any moral requirement to rescue children.

This is right. But, I never argued otherwise. I’ve only argued that subjectivism implies that such a person has no moral requirement to rescue children–they don’t have to do it because they don’t care to. This is the unacceptable result I’m referring to.

An Aside to Legitimate Criticism Under Subjectivism

Travis misunderstands my original comment, that:

… subjectivism cannot provide the grounds to legitimately criticise those with coherent sets of preferences/beliefs (no matter how vulgar), and so forth.

By this comment, I simply mean that it’s impossible for subjectivists to legitimately criticise those in question, since subjectivism cannot provide the grounds for such a thing. This comment wasn’t exactly expanded upon and as a result it is rather crude. For instance, it would be pertinent to clarify that those in question are also rightly capturing their own preferences (e.g. they’re not mistaken in their moral utterances about what they stand for).

This comment stems from the idea that in order to criticise, one must point to some mistake that a person is making. When talking about morality, we’re talking about moral mistakes. But, under subjectivism, if someone holds a coherent set of beliefs in relation to what they stand for, there is no mistake to be made. This is an issue, especially considering cases in which we come across people like committed misogynists who know what they stand for. I would point to a moral mistake in criticising this individual (e.g. men and women are actually moral equals), but subjectivism provides no room for this manoeuvre. They could appeal to non-moral considerations, e.g. misogynists are despised by society and you want to be liked by society, so it’s prudential for you to drop the misogyny. But not only does this criticism seem wrong headed (e.g. it seems that moral criticism is far more appropriate here) but it also fails provided that they don’t care about the additional considerations. For instance, the previous prudential argument wouldn’t work in a misogynistic society, or if the misogynist didn’t care how society perceived them.

At best, the subjectivist can say that they have different preferences, and ‘criticise’ the misogynist insofar as their preferences differ. But I’m not sure how much of a ‘legitimate criticism’ this would amount to. After all, the misogynist could happily return the same ‘criticism’ and it would be just as ‘legitimate’.

This comment was only a side point, so if it turns out to be mistaken, then I can live with that. However, this wouldn’t address a sister style argument regarding whether anti-realist views could account for the sort of criticism that is the attribution of blameworthiness (which seems much more serious to me). Though to be clear, this sister argument (if sound) would work against any metaethical view that rejected the existence of categorical moral reasons (so not just subjectivism).

Judging as Wrong and Moral Requirements

I’m only including this segment to cover my bases. I’m pretty sure Travis is NOT arguing for this, but denying that someone has a moral requirement to X, does not mean you’re fine with them not doing X. It’s on this point that someone might accuse my argument of relying on normative entanglement. For instance, “you’re arguing that subjectivism implies that subjectivists should be fine with the actions of anyone so long as it’s in line with that other person’s preferences/ moral requirements”.

But this is not at all what I’m arguing. This assumption would be built upon the false view iterated above. A subjectivist can very coherently judge someone who refrains from rescuing a child, even if the subjectivist thinks the individual had no moral requirement to rescue them. I never argued otherwise either.

A naive subjectivist might argue that since they personally have a preference for others to rescue children, that this also means that others have a moral requirement to rescue children. But this is clearly not true. Our preferences do not necessarily imply that others have moral requirements–at least under subjectivism.

The Argument Against Realism

At the beginning of this article I introduced the following argument against moral realism:

The Genocide Argument Against Realism

1. If moral realism is true, then there is nothing wrong with genocide.
   → Let’s just suppose this is true.

2. But, there is something wrong with genocide.

3. So, moral realism is false.

As mentioned before, I think that if the first premise was true, then this would be a good argument against moral realism. Further, I think it would be an argument that anti-realists like subjectivists could coherently utilise. However, if we interpret this argument in a similar style as Travis’ other interpretations, then the argument fails.

1. If moral realism is true, then there is nothing stance independently wrong with genocide.
   → Let’s just suppose this is true.

2. But, there is something stance independently wrong with genocide.

3. So, moral realism is false.

Notice how subjectivists could no longer coherently affirm premise two. But also notice that subjectivists could affirm premise one and still coherently say that there is something stance dependently wrong with genocide. This is the too narrow problem once more. If moral realism being true implied that that there is nothing wrong with genocide, it would dually imply that there is nothing stance independently nor stance dependently wrong with genocide. It would imply that there is nothing wrong in any sense with it.

Luckily, the first premise (in both arguments against realism) is false–at the very least there doesn’t seem to be any reason to believe that they’re true. In fact, certain conceptions of moral realism necessarily imply that things like genocide are wrong.⁴

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Conclusion

Travis’ response is tangled in a number of criticisms and accusations. By and large, Travis’ main error is in interpreting the Genocide argument and the Rescue argument too narrowly, allowing for alternative metaethical views to remain true whilst supposing that error theory / subjectivism were right.

Furthermore, Travis’ accusation that my arguments rely on ‘normative entanglement’ is unfounded. What I’ve argued is implied by each respective metaethical theory is in fact implied by them. In addition, I don’t rely on misleading and ambiguous premises to falsely imply anything that isn’t actually implied by each theory.

If error theory is true, it implies that there is nothing wrong (or right) with genocide in any sense. Unacceptable, because there really is something wrong with genocide.

If subjectivism is true, it implies that people who don’t care about rescuing drowning children lack a moral requirement to rescue them in any sense. Also unacceptable, because they would still be morally required to rescue children.

In addition, if the main point of my previous article is correct then it’s also true that these arguments aren’t question begging (which some people might accuse them of being).

*Edit

On a final clarifying note, I want to stress that I’m not merely arguing that I didn’t intend to mislead anyone (if I did) with my arguments. This would not sufficiently address the accusation of normative entanglement. So I will clarify that not only am I arguing that I had no intention of misleading my audience, but I also believe that my arguments weren’t misleading in the first place. Sure, it’s possible that someone could have been misled by them, but this applies to every argument. It strikes me that a reasonable bar to reach is that a reasonable person who doesn’t know much of anything about metaethics would not be misled. This is what I maintain about my arguments. That being said, Travis did convince me (in our discussion below) to add some clarifying sentences since it just helps to aid understanding regardless.

Travis wrote a response to this article, and we had an almost 3 hour discussion about it, which you can access here:

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1. I checked post-upload. Apparently it’s valid so long as premise two denies that the sufficient condition (in the nested conditional) implies the necessary condition–which is what I believe the original argument did.

2. I’d like to thank a friend of mine for highlighting this point to me. I felt it nicely captured why Travis’ interpretation didn’t jibe with the intention behind my arguments.

3. If you ‘have to X’, then you ‘have a moral requirement to X’.

4. See Moral Fixed Points.