Why Fulfil Our Function?
Even if we have a function as Aristotle argues, need we have reasons to fulfil it?
This was originally submitted as a short essay for one of my philosophy units.
Aristotle’s function argument aims to show that humans have a specific function, and that goodness (for humans) consists in fulfilling it.1 But more needs to be said about the significance (or rather, insignificance) of such a conclusion. I’m going to argue that even if the function argument succeeds, that it’s far from clear whether it’s necessarily rational to fulfil our function–that is, whether we necessarily have reason to fulfil our function, thus making it rational to fulfil, if it were.
Some action A is rational for one to do when one’s best reasons coincide with one’s doing A. For instance, if you want to study philosophy in an academic setting, it would be rational for you (all things being equal) to sign up for and attend a philosophy university course. One explanation of why this would be rational is that we have reason to fulfil our contingent commitments. Our wanting to study philosophy favours our signing up for a course, and thus we have a reason to sign up. My concern when it comes to Aristotle’s function argument is that it may not necessarily provide us with reasons to fulfil our function. This is a problem insofar as the function argument, at its core, is about showing what it’s rational to do–showing how one ought to live.2
Let me now introduce why I think such a problem exists. To see why functions needn’t imply reasons, I implore us to consider the human heart. Suppose the function of the human heart is to pump blood around the body. But notice that despite the fact that the heart has a function, that it has no reason to fulfil this function–it’s not rational for the heart to pump blood. However, if this is so, then it appears that possessing a function doesn’t necessarily imply having reasons to fulfil that function. Now, it could still be the case that humans necessarily have reasons to fulfil their function, but that would require further argumentation beyond the function argument.
I think a line of response that an Aristotelian could take is to link fulfilling one’s function with feeling fulfilled in one’s life.3 According to Aristotle, actions in accord with fulfilling one’s function are pleasant by nature and pleasant in their own right. A life of fulfilling one’s function is “best, finest, and most pleasant”.4 Then, starting from the plausible assumption that we always have reason5 to seek this sort of fulfilment–a most pleasant life–then we’d necessarily have reason to fulfil our function. It would thus be rational to fulfil our function. I think this can address the heart objection as it proclaims that it’s not having a function that in fact gives something reasons to fulfil it. It’s rather that only those who have reasons to seek their own fulfilment (such as humans) who have reasons to fulfil their function.
However, I think that unless the Aristotelian makes some controversial assumptions about human psychology, this response likely fails.6 The simple matter is some people would be fulfilled with a life that involved certain evils, such as harming others for their own gain (which amounts to fulfilment for them). But it doesn’t sound plausible to me to suggest that some people’s function, all things considered, is to commit certain evils. Nor does it seem to be what’s most rational for them to do. So, it doesn’t seem that fulfilling one’s function should be linked to finding fulfilment with one’s life (at least not in isolation).
In the end I think we’ve learned to appreciate where the rational force of fulfilling our function could stem from if we do indeed have such functions–things outside said functions. In addition, if my argument succeeds, we shouldn’t locate the rational force of functions merely with our own fulfilment.7
REFERENCES:
Aristotle. (2019). Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1. (T. Irwin, Ed.; Third edition.). Hackett Publishing Company Inc.
Aristotle (2019)
Aristotle (2019)
Which on Aristotle’s view would be a life of activity in the rational part of the soul.
Aristotle (2019) 8: §10, §13, §14
Not to imply that it’s always the most rational plan of action.
Namely that nobody could be legitimately fulfilled by having a life that contains various evils.
I think a plausible place to start could be doing one’s moral duty (especially if we have categorical reasons to act morally).
This is my take: the heart doesn’t pump blood because it decides to, it does so because circulation is its nature. In the same way, a truly rational person lives in harmony with their own nature by following higher principles such as love, creativity, truth, and unity. When we act from these qualities, we’re not forcing ourselves to be good, we’re allowing the intelligence of life itself to move through us. That’s why such actions feel both wise and deeply fulfilling.
I think Aristotle wasn’t interested with prescribing to socially incompatible sadists. I think he didn’t even imagine involving them in the realm of people you would have a conversation with, or try to “disprove”.
That’s what sharp rocks are for.
I think it’s a little silly to use universal lenses when interpreting anything Aristotle said. He was talking to his fellow Greek citizens, not to Turks. He has always struck me as deeply uninterested in what other peoples may do.